Network Effects: What Makes More Users Valuable
Imagine opening a pet-sitting marketplace with thousands of registered sitters. You need someone nearby next Saturday, but the available profiles are too far away, booked, or a poor fit for your dog. The marketplace has a large audience and still cannot help you. Now imagine a smaller service with several suitable sitters who can accept the booking. For this search, the smaller network is more useful.

That difference is the practical meaning of a network effect: an offering’s value to someone depends in part on who else participates and whether those people can connect. In systems markets, compatible components can matter alongside other users; a device becomes more useful when people can use it with relevant products and services. Katz and Shapiro describe this relationship between participation, compatibility, and value in their account of systems competition and network effects. A large user count may accompany a strong network effect, but the count alone does not establish one.
My working rule is to follow the benefit all the way to a person’s next action. Can the customer reach a relevant person, find a compatible service, or complete a transaction that was previously unlikely? If the answer is yes, added participation may be making the product more valuable. If the answer is only that the company can display a bigger membership number, the claim is incomplete. This distinction matters when choosing a platform to use, building one, or judging whether its size will protect it from competitors.
A network effect changes what another participant can do
Consider a messaging service. One additional account is useful to you if it belongs to someone you want to contact and the service lets you communicate with that person. An account belonging to a stranger you will never message adds little to your own experience. The value created by the added participant is therefore relational. It depends on the connection that becomes possible, not on the simple fact of registration.
This is a direct network effect: people on the same side gain value from being able to interact with one another. The most straightforward examples are communication services, where the potential recipient is also a user. Yet even there, the relevant network differs by person. A service with many total accounts can feel empty to someone whose family, colleagues, or customers cannot be reached on it. A smaller service can feel complete if the people that person needs are present.
The same test prevents a common mix-up between network effects and ordinary growth. A shop with more customers may earn more revenue, but the next customer’s purchase does not automatically make the shop’s goods more useful to existing customers. A product with a better search tool may win more users even if none of those users adds value for the others. Growth can be a consequence of a network effect, a cause of one, or simply growth from a better product. The distinguishing question is whether participation changes another participant’s benefit.
Nor must the effect be equally strong at every size. For a given user, the first reachable contacts can matter a great deal. Once everyone the user needs is reachable, additional distant or irrelevant accounts may add very little. This is a reason to resist claims that every new signup makes every existing user’s experience better by the same amount. The real effect depends on whose participation changes, who benefits, and what they can now do.
Two-sided markets depend on participation across groups
A marketplace has a different shape from a messaging service. It connects distinct groups through an intermediary: for example, people seeking pet care and people offering it. A customer’s options can improve when suitable sitters join; a sitter’s opportunity can improve when customers with suitable requests join. Economists call the value that travels between these groups an indirect network effect. Rysman’s explanation of two-sided markets describes the intermediary and the way each group’s decisions affect the other group’s outcomes.
The distinction is useful because adding people to the wrong side may leave the immediate problem unsolved. If customers can already find many available sitters but sitters receive few requests, recruiting still more sitters offers little reason for them to stay. If requests are arriving but available sitters are scarce, marketing to additional customers can produce more unsuccessful searches. In both cases the marketplace may grow in registrations while the experience on one side weakens. The effect runs through a feasible exchange, not through an undifferentiated crowd.
Participation on one side can also have mixed consequences for people on that same side. More sitters may offer customers greater choice while dividing a fixed number of bookings among more providers. More customers may create opportunities for sitters while making popular time slots harder for customers to secure if capacity is unchanged. Those are conditional outcomes, not universal predictions; they show why a claim such as “more users make the platform better” needs a named beneficiary and a named constraint.
The intermediary influences both groups. Search order, availability information, eligibility rules, and fees affect which participants meet and whether they choose to transact. A platform cannot manufacture a useful cross-group effect by adding profiles that buyers cannot locate or trust enough to contact. Conversely, better matching can make existing participation more useful before the company recruits anyone new. That is one reason platform design belongs in a discussion of network effects: it determines how much of the potential connection people can actually use.
Count possible matches, not just registered accounts
The word liquidity is often used for the ease of finding a counterpart and completing an exchange. For a local service, that ease is specific to place, time, service, price, and the needs of both people. A sitter who serves another city cannot accept a local booking. A local sitter who is unavailable next Saturday cannot fill it either. Both may count as active providers in a company report while offering no help for the particular request that brought the customer to the app.
Take an illustrative comparison. Marketplace A has 1,000 active sitters, of whom 20 meet a customer’s location, date, and service requirements. Marketplace B has 120 active sitters, of whom 35 meet those same requirements. If availability, quality, and ease of contact are otherwise comparable, B gives that customer more plausible choices despite its smaller headline network. The figures are invented for the comparison; they are not measurements of an actual platform. Their point is the denominator: the customer encounters relevant available supply, not the entire membership base.
The provider’s denominator is different. A sitter cares about suitable requests that can become work, not merely how many customers have downloaded the app. A marketplace could show many customer accounts and still offer little opportunity if most accounts are inactive or outside the sitter’s area. Counting both sides is necessary, but counting the matches possible between them is more revealing. The same principle applies to any service where eligibility, location, timing, or preferences narrow who can transact.
I would therefore start with the search or request a participant actually makes. How many suitable counterparts can that person see? How many are available? How many respond, and how often does a suitable exchange occur? These questions turn a vague promise of “network growth” into the experience the network is supposed to improve. They also show which remedy is appropriate. If suitable providers are missing, recruit them. If providers are present but buried under irrelevant results, improve discovery. If customers and providers find one another but do not agree on terms, additional signups may be a poor use of money.
The judgment has a cost. Tightening a marketplace around a service or location makes its audience look smaller, and better matching can require work on listings, availability, and search. Broad acquisition may produce more impressive account totals sooner. I would accept the smaller total if it raises the chance of a useful exchange for the people already there. A network that repeatedly works for a defined group has a clearer path to expansion than one whose advertised size masks unsuccessful searches.
Critical mass is a condition, not a magic user target
Early network businesses face a coordination problem. A customer hesitates to join a marketplace with few suitable providers. A provider hesitates to invest time in a marketplace with few suitable customers. Each group may be waiting for the other. This is why recruiting only one side can be expensive without making the service feel alive. The company has to create enough useful interaction for participants to have a reason to return.
“Critical mass” is a helpful term if it is used carefully. In the network model discussed by Economides and Himmelberg, it means the smallest network size that remains sustainable under the model’s assumptions, given factors such as costs and market structure; it is not a universal number of users that every platform must reach. Their critical-mass account concerns a specified economic model, so importing a single threshold into a pet-sitting app, a communications service, or a software ecosystem would claim more than the model says.
For an actual launch, I would describe the target in terms of continuing usefulness rather than a round signup figure. In a chosen area and service category, can customers usually find acceptable options, and do enough providers receive worthwhile requests to remain available? Those conditions still need a defined period and a clear account of who counts as active. They will differ between a booking service, where a provider has limited capacity on a given day, and a communication service, where the relevant question is whether the intended recipient can be reached. Critical mass in practice is a local operating question before it is a companywide milestone.
This suggests a narrow launch when the service depends on local matches. Concentrate outreach where both sides can meet, make the offer clear, and learn which requests fail. The sacrifice is obvious: people outside the initial area cannot use the service yet, and concentrating effort may slow the headline expansion of registered users. Spreading the same early supply and demand thinly across many areas may produce a larger map with little activity anywhere. I would expand only after the first segment can support repeated useful interactions, because that establishes what the next segment must reproduce.
A subsidy can help people try a new service, but paying for participation is not the same as making participation valuable. If an incentive brings a sitter onto a marketplace where no suitable requests arrive, the sitter’s reason to remain depends on the incentive rather than on customers. If the company withdraws it before useful demand develops, registrations can disappear without much change in actual service. The question is not simply how many users joined during a promotion. It is whether the added participants made the other side’s next interaction better.
Pricing must support both sides of the exchange
Two-sided platforms can set charges and design rules for each group. That makes pricing a participation decision as well as a revenue decision. A fee for providers may affect how many providers appear; a charge or other cost for customers may affect how many requests arrive. The two responses feed back into one another. The point is not that one side must always be free. It is that the same fee can have consequences beyond the group that pays it.
Suppose a marketplace already has sufficient customer requests but too few available sitters. Lowering the cost of joining for suitable sitters might create more options for customers. If the marketplace instead has many sitters but few requests, the same subsidy could attract more idle listings. In that condition, reducing the customer’s cost or making it easier to find an appropriate sitter may do more for both groups. These are conditional choices, not a formula for the “correct” fee. The platform needs to know which side is limiting useful exchanges and whether the price change will attract the people needed to relieve that limit.
Fees also have to be evaluated after the first transaction. A low introductory charge can fill an empty page, yet a platform that cannot cover the continuing cost of service may not sustain the connections it creates. A higher charge can fund matching or support, but it can also deter one group and weaken value for the other. I would favor a fee structure that keeps suitable participants active and makes the exchange worth completing. That may require accepting less revenue per early transaction; it should not require pretending that participation alone pays the bills.
This is one reason a network effect does not dictate a standard business model. Two marketplaces with the same number of users may need different prices because their participants have different alternatives, capacities, and reasons to join. The relationship between platform participation and the value available across groups explains why pricing and design should be considered together; the existence of a network effect alone does not identify which group should bear the fee.
Compatibility can enlarge a network without adding accounts
Some network value comes from compatible products and services rather than from more people signing up for the same service. A user choosing a device or system may care whether useful complements work with it. Katz and Shapiro’s discussion of systems markets makes compatibility central to how participation affects value. The network in this setting includes the parts that can be used together, not only the customers of one seller.
Imagine two services that allow people to communicate. If a user of one can reach a user of the other, the user may gain access to a larger set of contacts without changing accounts. If the services cannot connect, each asks people to choose where the people they need will be. This is an illustration of the compatibility decision, not a claim that a particular pair of services offers or refuses such access. It shows why the relevant question is often “Who and what can I use this with?” rather than “How many accounts does this company control?”
Compatibility changes the competitive judgment too. A large installed base can help a system when users or complement makers value access to that base. If compatibility lets a smaller system serve the same relationships or products, the incumbent’s account lead may matter less to the next user. If compatibility is limited, a newcomer may need to create enough connections of its own to be useful. Neither condition guarantees an outcome: quality, prices, preferences, and the practical ability to use the compatible parts still matter.
For a product decision, I would ask what users lose when they leave or mix systems. Do they lose contact with people, access to compatible services, or only a familiar interface? That distinction prevents a company from treating every kind of habit as a network effect. It also helps a customer judge whether choosing a popular system is necessary for the intended use or merely convenient. A compatibility choice can extend useful reach; it can also limit how distinctive a closed system feels. The right call depends on which connections people actually value.
Rising usage does not by itself reveal the cause
Suppose a marketplace’s completed bookings rise after it adds sitters. It is tempting to call the increase a network effect. Yet the company may also have improved search, advertised to new customers, changed fees, or entered a busier season. The result is real; the explanation is still open. Calling any growth a network effect makes the idea too broad to guide a decision.
The useful comparison is specific to the interaction. For customers searching in the same area and service category, did more available suitable sitters make a successful booking more likely or faster? For sitters, did more suitable requests make participation more worthwhile? Looking at bookings per customer search and work per active sitter is more informative than looking only at total bookings or total accounts. A rising total can coexist with a falling rate of success for the individual who opens the service.
The denominator matters enough to change the apparent answer. Imagine, purely for illustration, that 100 customer searches produce 40 bookings, then 200 searches produce 60 bookings after a signup campaign. Total bookings rose from 40 to 60. The booking rate fell from 40 out of 100 searches to 60 out of 200. This does not prove the network became worse; customer needs or availability may have changed. It does show why “more transactions” and “more value per participant” are different statements. To judge the latter, the company must look at comparable requests and the choices people actually had.
There is a second question after measuring a gain: did it persist? A newly added sitter might be available for a single promotion, while a regular sitter could offer a dependable option over time. Similarly, a new customer account may produce one request or repeated suitable work for providers. The network benefit that matters to a participant is the one available when they return, not an account that was counted once. I would use this distinction before spending heavily to expand a marketplace that has not yet made its existing matches reliable.
Scale does not guarantee a single winner
The strongest popular claim about network effects is that a bigger platform must eventually absorb the rest. That conclusion does not follow from the definition. The benefit of adding participants can be real while customers still prefer different designs, services, prices, or groups of providers. The market can also allow the same person to use more than one platform. These conditions change how strongly size protects any one operator.
A study of a pet-sitting platform merger found that the benefits from combining participants could be offset by the loss of a differentiated option. That is a concrete warning against treating consolidation as an automatic improvement for users; it is a result from the studied setting, not a verdict on every merger or marketplace. The authors’ pet-sitting merger study puts the value of more possible connections beside the value of keeping different platform choices.
The same logic applies before a merger. If one marketplace serves a particular set of preferences well, a rival with more total accounts may still be less useful to those customers. If a customer can find suitable providers on several services, the larger service cannot assume the customer will stop comparing them. If providers can list on several platforms without much cost, a rival may offer access to some of the same supply. None of these possibilities removes network effects. Each changes how much an exclusive user count tells us about competitive advantage.
Economists use multihoming for participation in more than one platform. A model of two-sided transaction-platform competition examines how the cost of multihoming can affect fee levels and structure under its stated assumptions. For a real marketplace, that is a reason to ask how costly it is for customers and providers to use alternatives before predicting that one platform’s scale will dictate prices. It is not a universal fee forecast.
There can be costs on both sides of that choice. A provider may need to keep availability current in multiple places; a customer may need to repeat a search or maintain several accounts. When those costs are high, a platform with many relevant participants may be harder to leave. When they are low, the same people can participate in competing networks, and a large published membership number says less about exclusivity. To understand a platform’s position, I would ask where useful activity happens and whether its participants can take that activity elsewhere.
Where I would look before betting on a network effect
The most useful way to describe a network effect is a complete sentence: When this kind of participant joins, this other participant can do this specific thing better, under these conditions. For a local pet-sitting marketplace, that might mean an available sitter in the right area and time gives a customer another plausible booking option. For a communication service, it might mean a person can reach a contact who was previously unreachable. For a system of complementary products, it might mean a compatible service becomes available to its users. If the sentence cannot name the improved action, “network effect” is probably doing too much rhetorical work.
For someone building a platform, I would then choose the smallest group in which that improvement can become routine. Bring in relevant participants on both sides, make them findable to each other, and watch whether useful interactions repeat. Expand into the next group only when the same mechanism can be reproduced there. The cost is slower breadth and less impressive early membership figures. The gain is a clearer answer to the question that determines whether people stay: can they use the network for the thing they joined to do?
For someone choosing between platforms, I would make the comparison at the level of the intended task. Search for available counterparts, compatible products, or reachable contacts; examine whether the terms of using them are acceptable. A giant network may be the right choice when it contains the people or complements you need. A smaller one may be better when it gives you more relevant options or serves your preferences more closely. Total size is context, not the decision.